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purpose to direct the exclusion of one disclosure device aiid'the
use of the other where the party to be examined was an Alabama
resident, and where the use of interrogatories might obviate-the
need for later depositions.5 6
It is submitted that refusal to permit interrogatories to be
used concurrently with depositions may serve to avoid harrassment.
However, as in Ford, it appears that courts will Ilow such concurrent use where the facts of the particular case warrant it.
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CPLR 3 11(a)(8) and (9).: Defendant allowed further objection
where basis of jurisdiction uwcertain.
5
In Kelly v. Stanmar, Iw.,1
plaintiff sought damages. for breach
of contract from defendant, a foreign. corporation. The defendant
moved, under CPLR 3211 (a) (8), to 'dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the court lacked in personam jurisdiction. The court
held that since defendant was not authorized to engage in business
in New York, and since performance of the contract was to be
in Vermont, it did not have in personam jurisdiction. However,
the court noted that the complaint stated a cause of iiction against
the defendant for an in rem judgment .under CPLR 314(2), which
could divest defendant of its interest in a bond .and promissory
note executed by plaintiff in New Ydrk ancr held in New York
by the other defendant, a New York bank. The court, therefore,
granted the plaintiff the right to amend his complaint to include this
inrem cause of action.
The court then noted that since only one motior' to dismiss
is permitted under CPLR 3211, and since the defendant had moved
under 3211(a) (8), he was technically precluded from urging that
the court lacked jurisdiction under CPLR 314(2) or (3). However, under the circumstances, since the plaintiff himself was uncertain as to the type of jurisdiction that he was asserting, the
court said that it would overlook the defendant's -error, "since" the
moving papers described the alleged defect sufficiently cleaily'.o
apprise the plaintiff of its nature and thus will not' result in any
prejudice to him." Is
The defendant could, therefore, move under 3211(a) (9),
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. However, it would appear-that
since the court .has already stated ,that the plaintiff has a.-valid in
56 Ford Motor Co. v. 0. W. Burke Co., supra note 55, at 421, 27
N.Y.S.2d at 271. But see Katz v. Posner, 23 App. Div. 2d 774, 258 N.Y.S.2d

508 (2d Dep't 1965).

5 51 Misc. 2d 378, 273 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. -Ct. Albany County. 1966).,
5sKelly v. Stannar, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 378, 380, 273 N.Y.S2d 276, 278

(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1966).
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rem cause of action under 314(2), this would preclude such a
dismissal. At this point, defendant could do one of two things:
he could withdraw from the action and take an in rein default,
or he could defend the action on the merits. If he does the
latter, he will subject himself to full in personarn jurisdiction
pursuant to CPLR 320(c).
Thus, the practitioner would be well advised, in cases where
there is doubt as to the basis for plaintiff's action, to move for a
dismissal under both CPLR 3211 (a) (8) and (9).
CPLR 3213:

Accommodation indorser of promissory note held
amenable to summary judgment.
In actions on an "instrument for the payment of money only,"
CPLR 3213 permits the plaintiff to seek summary judgment upon
service of a summons with a notice of motion and supporting
affidavits in lieu of a complaint. However, the determination of
who is liable on an "instrument for the payment of money only"
has been left to judicial interpretation.
It has been held that the maker or co-maker is liable on the
instrument itself.59 Also, in M. Gilsten, Inc. v. Ullman,60 it was
held that an action against an unconditional guarantor of a promisSory note was an action on the instrument.6 ' A question has
arisen as to whether an accommodation indorser of a promissory
note was primarily liable on the instrument and, thus, amenable
to summary proceedings under CPLR 3213.
2
The court, in Welbilt Concrete Constr. Corp. v. Kornicki,
answered this question in the affirmative. However, it appears
that, both under the Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uniform
Commercial Code, the accommodation indorser's liability is, in fact,
secondary, since there must first be a demand and notice of dishonor
before his liability is established. 63 Nonetheless, it would appear
that, although the accommodation indorser's liability on a promissory
note is secondary, since his liability is based on an "instrument for
the payment of money only," the speedy relief afforded plaintiffs
under CPLR 3213 should be available. However, if the defendant, in answering the plaintiff's motion, raises actual issues of
fact as to whether or not he did receive the necessary demand and
59See,

e.g., McGoldrick v. Family Fin. Corp., 287 N.Y. 535, 41 N.E.2d
86 (1942); Trietel v. Gibson, 131 Misc. 377, 226 N.Y. Supp. 603 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1928).
60 45 Misc. 2d 6, 255 N.Y.S2d 747 (Dist Ct Nassau County 1965).
61 However, the contract of guaranty in that case provided that an action
could be brought against the unconditional guarantor without first having
proceeded against the maker of the note, thereby making the guarantor
primarily liable.
6226 App. Div. 2d 661, 272 N.Y.S.2d 422 (2d Dep't 1966).
63 See NIL §§ 3, 55, 14; UCC §§ 3-414, 3-415.

